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SEARCHING FOR POSITMSM 
Philip Soper* 
INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM. By W.J. Waluchow. Oxford: Clar-
endon Press. 1994. Pp. vii, 290. $49.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Issues in philosophy have life cycles of their own. Problems ne-
glected or forgotten revive - either in response to the times (wit-
ness the renewed interest in political theory during the Vietnam 
War) or in response to a new and original argument (the revival of 
Kantian ethics after Rawls). Once revived, these issues often enjoy 
a brief period of in~ense flourishing, followed by a gradual return to 
dormancy - either because the times move on to make the issue 
less pressing, or because a point of diminishing originality or inter-
est is reached in academic discussions. 
The nature-of-law issue in jurisprudence might seem to be in the 
late stages of one of these periodic cycles. Revived more than thirty 
years ago with the appearance of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of 
Law1 and energized by Ronald Dworkin's original reformulation of 
the "natural law" side of the issue,2 the entire field flourished over 
the next quarter century in a way that was both unprecedented and 
bound to lead to subtle and enlightening refinements. 
In view of the extensive interest in this issue in recent years, one 
understandably might think that we are now close to exhaustion 
and that little more can be expected until the next turn of the cycle. 
All the more pleasant to discover Professor Waluchow's3 fine book. 
Waluchow's contribution is original and beautifully crafted, and it 
also provides one of the best overviews of the debate during the 
past thirty years. The writing style is enviable for its clarity, and the 
argument is admirably honest, giving fair due to opposing views and 
anticipating and handling virtually all serious objections to the ar-
gument that might occur to any reader. Although the book is 
* James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, M.S. 1965, 
Washington, St. Louis; J.D. 1969, Harvard; Ph.D. 1972, Washington, St. Louis. - Ed. 
1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (originally published in 1961). 
2. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE {1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S 
EMPIRE]; Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter Dworkin, 
Hard Cases]; Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967) [herein-
after Dworkin, The Model of Rules]; Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 
YALE LJ. 855 {1972) [hereinafter Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory]. 
3. Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, McMaster University. 
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pitched at a fairly high level - one that seems to take for granted 
reader familiarity with much of the literature in the area - the 
result for those who follow this field is a rich and rewarding tour of 
the landscape. Despite the familiar themes and issues, Waluchow 
never fails to place his own stamp on them by the way he summa-
rizes, clarifies, or refines the ideas. The book deserves a place on 
anyone's jurisprudence shelf. 
What makes Waluchow's book so intriguing, in part, is that it 
purports to aim at a very narrow question - a small gap, one might 
think, in positivist legal theory. Waluchow indeed is refreshingly, if 
unnecessarily, modest in confessing to a "fairly narrow scope" and a 
"lack of novelty" in his thesis (p. 4). But the gap he aims to fill, as is 
often the case, proves to be a chink through which one sees, with 
the aid of Waluchow's analysis, deep inside the natural law-
positivism debate. As a result, one comes away with a clearer view 
of the entire field as well as a powerful argument for a new and 
arguably better form of positivism. 
The small gap in the positivist literature results from an interest-
ing twist on the usual question that underlies these debates. The 
question usually posed is whether there is a necessary (conceptual) 
connection between law and morality; Waluchow asks instead 
whether there is a necessary lack of connection between these con-
cepts. This shift in focus reflects developments in legal theory since 
Hart's book first appeared. Whereas Hart suggested that connec-
tions between law and morality were, at best, contingent rather 
than necessary, subsequent developments in the positivist litera-
ture, supported by characterizations of positivism from the natural 
law side, support a stronger thesis: Far from there being no neces-
sary connection between law and morality, there is a necessary 
separation of law and morality; moral standards cannot be part of 
the "law" in legal systems. 
Waluchow calls this strong thesis, most clearly associated with 
the work of Joseph Raz,4 "exclusive positivism." He sets out, in 
contrast to Raz, to defend "inclusive positivism" - the view, origi-
nally suggested by Hart, that law may include moral standards, but 
need not do so. In the course of the argument, Waluchow also 
presents two other theses: (1) Inclusive positivism is distinguishable 
from and superior to Dworkin's alternative, nonpositivist account 
of how moral principles figure in law; and (2) Although it is a con-
tingent question whether a legal system includes moral principles 
among the legal standards courts are asked to apply, it is in general 
a good thing for them to do so. 
4. See JosEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 47 (1979). 
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Along the way to establishing these claims, Waluchow develops 
a number of original distinctions and insights into the current de-
bate - too many to be summarized usefully here. In this review, I 
focus on the central argument of the book - whether and why pos-
itivism can or cannot accept moral principles as part of the law and, 
assuming it can, whether the case for positivism over natural law is 
thus strengthened. In brief, I argue: (1) that Waluchow does estab-
lish a case for viewing inclusive positivism as superior in some re-
spects to exclusive positivism; but (2) that this victory is only partial 
- neither version of positivism, exclusive or inclusive, is quite good 
enough. The central idea of the natural law theorist concerning the 
conceptual connection between law and morality survives the chal-
lenge of both forms of positivism because that connection is of a 
different - and more modest - kind than commonly has been 
assumed. 
I. THE BACKGROUND 
The question about the status of moral principles in legal theory 
began as a by-product of the debate that followed Dworkin's chal-
lenge to Hart.5 Dworkin stressed that the "right answers" to legal 
decisions were, in theory, to be found by undertaking a Herculean 
inquiry in two dimensions: (1) institutional history - convention 
and legal norms identified by the ordinary positivist's pedigree (the 
"fit" dimension); and (2) the political and moral theories that pro-
vide the best justification for using those conventions as the basis 
for state coercion (the. "moral" dimension). Dworkin's theory en-
countered two initial responses designed to suggest that the theory 
might, after all, be just another form of positivism. First, because 
the requirement of "fit" seemed to restrict Dworkin's moral princi-
ples to the conventions of the particular society in which judges 
found themselves (conventional morality, not true morality), some 
claimed that Dworkin had advanced only a more refined version of 
positivism: conventional moral principles should be added to the 
positivist's conventional rules as part of the "pedigree" or test for 
determining legal norms.6 Second, even if Dworkin was right that 
the moral dimension required a judge to reach beyond conventional 
morality into true principles of political morality, that fact was itself 
the result of social conventions authorizing or requiring judges to 
adopt this particular method of adjudication. Thus, just as Hart had 
suggested that legal systems contingently could include moral stan-
dards (as in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitu-
5. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 2; Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 2; 
Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 2. 
6. See, e.g., Rolf Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151, 156 
{1971). 
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tion), so Dworkin's theory could be viewed as reflecting an 
assignment to judges in Anglo-American jurisdictions to test laws 
by reference to political morality - a contingent fact about Anglo-
American jurisprudence rather than a necessary feature of all legal 
systems.7 
It was Dworkin's response to this second suggestion for putting 
a positivist gloss on his theory that led to the first explicit statement 
of the thesis that Waluchow calls "exclusive positivism." Positivism, 
according to Dworkin, could not invite judges simply to use moral 
standards to decide cases and still remain positivism. That is be-
cause positivism 
is connected to a more general theory of law - in particular to a 
picture of law's function. This is the theory that law provides a set-
tled, public and dependable set of standards for private and official 
conduct, standards whose force cannot be called into question by 
some individual official's perception of policy or morality.8 
Two features about morality, according to Dworkin, prevent a 
positivist from counting moral standards as part of the law: first, 
because moral standards are inherently controversial, they could 
count as "law" only by abandoning the positivist's central thesis 
about law's essential function; second, even if one thinks moral 
standards rest on objectively determinable "moral facts," that claim 
about the status of moral judgments is itself controversial; the 
whole point of positivism, according to Dworkin, is to provide a 
theory of law that is "independent of any controversial theory 
either of metaethics or of moral ontology."9 
As noted, Dworkin's claim about the legal status of moral stan-
dards under positivism initially was tendered simply as a response 
to critics of his theory; it was not the result of a full-fledged argu-
ment about the "essence" of positivism. But, then, neither was 
Hart's contrary suggestion. Hart's remark that legal norms could 
incorporate moral standards seemed almost an offhand, casual way 
of responding indirectly to some of the arguments of his main an-
tagonist at the time, Lon Fuller. Fuller's emphasis on the role of 
purpose and reason in the interpretation and application of legal 
rules would be consistent with the denial of a necessary connection 
between law and morality if the appeal to such standards were sim-
7. This argument, which Dworkin labeled "Soper-Lyons positivism," also has been made 
by Jules Coleman. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 348 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation 
of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977); David Lyons, Princi-
ples, Positivism and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977) (reviewing DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra); Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 139 {1982). 
8. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 347. Waluchow discusses 
Dworkin's argument at pp. 182-90. 
9. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 349. 
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ply the result of a contingent incorporation of morality in legal 
provisions.10 
In his later work, Dworkin repeated his claim about the essence 
of positivism. By now the version of positivism that Dworkin 
thought inconsistent with the "essence" of positivism had assumed 
a new name - "soft conventionalism." "[S]oft conventionalism in-
structs judges to decide according to their own interpretation of the 
concrete requirements of legislation and precedent, even though 
this may be controversial . . . . [S]oft conventionalism is not really a 
form of conventionalism at all .... It is, rather, a very abstract, 
underdeveloped form of law as integrity."11 Despite the new name, 
Dworkin's defense of the view that soft conventionalism could not 
be a "true" form of positivism remained, at that point in the debate, 
still too cursory to be much more than an assertion rather than a 
full-fledged argument.12 Moreover, although Hart never returned 
publicly to the debate before his death, the postscript published 
with the most recent edition of The Concept of Law seems to con-
firm, in some respects, Hart's continued endorsement of a more re-
laxed form of positivism - a form that Hart called "soft 
positivism."13 On the question whether standards could count as 
"law" if they were too controversial or uncertain, Hart seemed to 
say that the question was one of degree: legal systems could toler-
ate some uncertainty and still provide the kind of guidance and so-
cial control that was an important, though not necessarily a 
"paramount and oven:J.ding," concern for a positivist theory.14 As 
for Dworkin's second objection - that positivism required a theory 
of law that remained independent of controversial questions about 
the status of moral judgments - Hart seemed to agree: "I still 
think legal theory should avoid commitment to controversial philo-
sophical theories of the general status of moral judgments and 
should leave open, as I do in this book, the general question of 
whether they have what Dworkin calls 'objective standing.' "ls 
10. Compare HART, supra note 1, at 2o4 (making the point about legal systems incorpo-
rating moral principles: "If this is what is meant by the necessary connection of law and 
morals, its existence should be conceded") with id. at 207 (referring explicitly to Fuller's 
"inner morality of law": "Again, if this is what the necessary connection of law and morality 
means, we may accept it."). 
11. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 125, 127-28. 
12. For a critique of Dworkin's refusal to recognize soft conventionalism as a form of 
positivism, see Philip Soper, Dworkin's Domain, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1166, 1177-79 (1987) 
(reviewing DWORKIN, LAw's EMPrRE, supra note 2). 
13. See HART, supra note 1, at 250-54. It is not clear whether this second edition of 
Hart's book, which was published in 1994 with the additional postscript, was available to 
Waluchow before the appearance of his book. 
14. See id. at 252. 
15. Id. at 253-54 (citation omitted). 
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It remained to Joseph Raz to provide, in contrast to this rather 
casual exchange of views between Dworkin and Hart, the first fully 
sustained argument in defense of the view that law could not in-
clude moral principles among the tests for legal validity. Raz called 
this thesis the "strong social thesis" or, simply, the "sources the-
sis."16 As Waluchow characterizes it, this is the view 
that the existence of a valid legal rule is solely a function of whether it 
has the appropriate source in legislation, judicial decision or social 
custom, matters of pure social fact, of pedigree, which can be estab-
lished independently of moral factors. In addition, the content of a 
legal rule can be determined, Raz believes, by establishing facts about 
human beings (e.g. their legislative actions and intentions) that can be 
ascertained without the use of moral arguments. [p. 82; footnote 
omitted] 
In defending this view, Raz affirmed Dworkin's vision about the 
essence of positivism but, of course, argued that his own vision was 
a better theory of law than its alternatives - particularly 
Dworkin's. 
The point of rehearsing this background is that it enables one 
better to appreciate Waluchow's contribution. Like Raz, Waluchow 
also provides a full-fledged inquiry - the only one apart from 
Raz's of which I am aware17 - into the question whether law can 
include moral standards. Unlike Raz, Waluchow endorses Hart's 
original suggestion: soft positivism - "inclusive" positivism for 
Waluchow - is a viable form of positivism and preferable to Raz's 
exclusive form. But whereas Raz's endorsement of exclusive posi-
tivism meant that he did not need to confront Dworkin's claim that 
soft positivism was really not positivism at all,18 Waluchow cannot 
avoid Dworkin's challenge. Thus, he devotes a significant portion 
of his book to explaining why, contrary to Dworkin's view, inclusive 
positivism does not collapse into a form of natural law or law-as-
integrity. It is to these two arguments that I now turn. 
II. EXCLUSIVE POSITIVISM 
A. The Central Argument 
John Austin began his famous lectures on jurisprudence with the 
observation that law, in its most general sense, "may be said to be a 
rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelli-
gent being having power over him."19 Though he hardly could have 
16. See RAz, supra note 4, at 47. 
17. For an earlier, but briefer, exploration of this question, see PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY 
OF LAW 101-09 (1984). 
18. Raz's view on this issue was that soft positivism "is on the borderline of positivism 
and may or may not be thought consistent with it." RAZ, supra note 4, at 47. 
19. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18 (Wilfrid E. 
Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (1832). 
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anticipated the debate that was to occur 150 years later over the 
implications of his theory, Austin's simple statement indirectly ex-
plains the appeal of exclusive positivism. To count as law, a stan-
dard at a minimum must be able to serve as a guide to human 
conduct. The point has less to do with the peculiarly "legal" than it 
does with the prerequisites for speaking of a system of social con-
trol in the first place. Only standards that are reasonably able to 
convey to subjects what they are expected to do can serve as means 
of social control. 
Although Waluchow confronts this basic claim about the func-
tion of law head on, he does not always seem to appreciate its force. 
In part that is because he is, if anything, too catholic in his will~g­
ness to examine each and every argument for exclusive positivism 
made by, or implied in the writings of, its main proponent, Joseph 
Raz. Thus Waluchow confronts the "linguistic argument," the "ar-
gument from bias," the "institutional connection argument," the 
"argument from explanatory power," the "argument from func-
tion," and the "authority argument" (pp. 103-40). While Waluchow 
does not suggest that each of these arguments is equally plausible 
- and, by and large, his critique of these arguments is persuasive 
- the effect of his wide-ranging survey and meticulous criticism is 
to detract from the central argument, the argument from function. 
To illustrate how the central argument eclipses the others, con-
sider, for example, the argument from authority, to which 
Waluchow devotes the most attention. Raz believes that law claims 
authority, even though it does not always have authority.20 In order 
even to claim authority, however, legal systems must satisfy the log-
ical preconditions for authority. Relying on an analogy to arbitra-
tion, Raz explains that these conditions entail that when the 
authority makes a decision, the factors that went into that decision 
are then excluded from reconsideration by those who are subject to 
the authority. The authority represents the "executive" stage of 
decisionmaking that follows deliberation. There could be no au-
thority if those subject to the authority could go behind the decision 
to reconsider the reasons on which the decision was based. So, too, 
with law and morality. Whenever an institution, judge, or legislator 
makes a decision based on moral factors, those underlying moral 
factors are excluded from the factors that "guide" the citizen; what 
remains as "law" is the decision itself - the legal norm or rule 
identified by the social fact of the decision. 
Waluchow's discussion of this argument (pp. 129-40), which ex-
amines in some detail Raz's account of exclusionary reasons as it 
relates to his concept of authority, seems an unnecessary diversion 
for two reasons. First, it is not clear that law does claim authority in 
20. See JosEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 70-105 (1986). 
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Raz's sense.21 If law makes no such claim, or in any event if this 
issue is controversial, then the argument for exclusive positivism -
to the extent that it depends on insisting that law claims authority 
- will be equally controversial. Second, and more to the point, it 
does not matter whether or not law claims authority because before 
law can do so it first must explain what is to be done. It first must 
provide guidance about the act to be done before it can attach to 
that act any further claims about the spirit in which the act is to be 
done, for example, in response to a claimed obligation to obey, or 
simply in order to avoid a sanction. Guiding action, in short, must 
come first; if standards are incapable of doing this, they seem a for-
tiori incapable of serving as the basis for a claim of authority, or a 
command, or a norm, or a piece of advice.22 
The metaphor that has figured in so much of the debate about 
the nature of law - that of the gunman - illustrates the point. 
Imagine a mugger who gives me the following order: "Hand over 
your money if it is the just thing to do." Should we say that this 
gunman has given a rather vague order? Or should we say instead, 
as the exclusive positivist presumably would, that this gunman has 
not yet given any order at all? If one thinks that the simple instruc-
tion "do justice" is too indefinite to provide a guide to expected 
conduct, several remedies are possible. The most obvious is to 
await further clarification by the speaker. Once a decision is made 
- in the above case by the gunman about what he thinks I should 
do, or what he thinks justice requires - doubt about what is ex-
pected dissolves. Another possibility, which requires switching 
from the metaphor of the gunman to an analogy with common law 
courts, is this: repeated decisions about what "justice" requires may 
begin to accumulate in a way that permits extrapolating from past 
cases to a conclusion about what consistency would require in the 
instant case.23 In either case one needs something more - clarifi-
cation or context - before one can tell what is expected. 
21. For a defense of the view that law makes a weaker normative claim than that entailed 
by the "claim of authority," see Philip Soper, Law's Normative Claims, in THE AUTONOMY 
OF LAW (Robert George ed., forthcoming 1996). 
22. As another recent supporter of Raz's view suggests, "law is the determinations of 
authorities of what ought to be done." Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The lnten· 
lions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 359 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). 
23. In previous work, I suggested that one could view the common law in just this way. 
Starting from the simple rule of recognition that "[a]ll disputes are to be settled as justice 
requires," one might build up a body of case law that, together with the requirement of 
consistency (treat like cases alike), would produce a fairly determinate system of law. See 
Soper, supra note 7, at 512 & n.129. For an arguably similar view of the common law, see 
Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL L. REV. 
913, 963-93 (1989). Waluchow here follows Dworkin in rejecting such a rule of recognition as 
too indeterminate to function as a "legal system." Seep. 185. In doing so, he ignores the 
point that the. system could become determinate over time. He also seems to ignore his own 
willingness elsewhere to accept that moral standards may be more determinate depending on 
May 1996] Legal Positivism 1747 
B. Critique of the Central Argument 
Waluchow considers the argument from function as it appears 
both in Dworkin's claims about the essence of positivism as well as 
in Raz's more elaborate theory. In both cases, his response is es-
sentially the same. First, Waluchow claims that even if relative cer-
tainty in guiding conduct is an important goal of law, it need not be 
viewed as the "essential" or only goal; law can serve other func-
tions. For example, law may have "educative" functions (p. 132) 
that accept some uncertainty in return for the value of having 
judges and litigants think and argue in substantive moral terms 
(pp. 121-22, 134-35). Second, even if relative certainty is a major 
characteristic of legal standards, some moral standards are some-
times relatively certain, or at least no more uncertain than some of 
the social facts that the positivist counts as law. 
The first of these objections leads to the problem of definition 
that has always haunted this field: How are we to resolve disputes 
about the "essence" of a concept and, thus, about whether the con-
cept of law is "essentially" connected to the concept of certainty?24 
I shall return later to this objection. For now, it is the second objec-: 
tion that most directly challenges the sharp distinction that the ex-
clusive positivist draws between moral and legal standards. That 
distinction assumes that a clear conceptual or practical difference 
regarding certainty justifies distinguishing social facts from moral 
standards and warrants allowing only the former to serve as candi-
dates for legal standards.25 In order to assess this issue, it may help 
to confront an ambiguity that hinders the discussion: What kind of 
uncertainty is at stake? 
1. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy 
Waluchow notes that there is a distinction "between uncertainty 
(an epistemic property) and indeterminacy (a logical property)" 
(p. 238). Standards that are indeterminate do not admit of "cor-
how "mature" the legal system is. Seep. 203 (discussing Dworkin's view that an advanced 
system of law, "thick with constitutional rules and .•• dense with precedents," may produce 
right answers by reference to moral and political theory). Waluchow also states that 
It would be a serious mistake to think that reasoning about moral rights and freedoms, 
whether private or public, can take place independently of contextual considerations. 
What one is entitled to expect from government, other public institutions, and indeed 
from other private citizens, depends in large part on shared understandings, expecta-
tions, historical circumstances, and so on .... 
P.145. 
24. For the suggestion that questions about the connection between law and certainty 
almost have become more critical to legal theory than the traditional question of the connec-
tion between law and morality, see SOPER, supra note 17, at pp. 101-09. 
25. At times Waluchow's response to this issue seems to proceed on the level of simple 
assertion and counterassertion (the exclusive positivist: "moral standards are too uncertain"; 
\Valuchow: "no they aren't - and anyway, social facts can be equally uncertain"). 
1748 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1739 
rect'' answers, even in theory; thus indeterminacy entails uncer-
tainty. But the converse is not true; a standard whose application is 
uncertain may, nevertheless, have a single correct answer, even 
though that answer is controversial and difficult to ascertain. 
Which of these concepts is the critical one for theories of law 
that stress the importance of law's ability to guide conduct? If legal 
standards must be able to answer questions about what one is ex-
pected to do, one might think that uncertainty is the critical con-
cept. Standards that fail to guide, either because they admit of no 
single correct application or because the correct application is in-
herently controversial, are equally incapable of constraining judges 
and guiding citizens. In both cases, then, a judge applying such 
standards must be making law, not finding it. 
Although he is not always clear on this point, Waluchow seems 
to accept indeterminacy rather than uncertainty as the critical, lim-
iting concept in deciding whether we are dealing with "law." The 
relationship between these two concepts and Waluchow's views on 
its implications for a positivist theory of law can be found in the 
following three conclusions that he seems to support. 
First, indeterminacy is inevitable in any legal system, both be-
cause some moral standards that one tries to enact as law may have 
no determinative answer (pp. 186, 223) and because of the open 
texture of language in most legal standards.26 In these cases, there 
is no law until a judicial decision is made, and judges in such cases 
must be seen as legislating. 
Second, moral standards do "sometimes provide correct and un-
controversial answers to questions of legal validity" (p. 226). In 
such cases, moral standards can be counted as law, consistent with 
the function of providing guidance. 
Finally, as to moral questions that might be thought to be inher-
ently controversial, these standards could also qualify as law for a 
positivist as long as they still can be said to have a right answer 
(p. 224). In other words, only those moral standards that entail in-
determinacy fail to qualify as law; uncertainty alone is not disquali-
fying. It is this last conclusion that seems to indicate that Waluchow 
- like Dworkin, on whose arguments Waluchow here relies -
views indeterminacy, rather than uncertainty, as the critical factor 
governing whether moral standards can count as law. As to the ob-
jection that uncertain standards, even if they have right answers, 
cannot provide the guiding function critical to law, Waluchow's re-
26. Waluchow, in a sensible discussion of Hart's views on the issue, suggests that the 
question of whether standards are detenninate is a matter not only of the "plain meaning" of 
the language, but of purposes and background understandings that often supplement lan-
guage to yield detenninable results. In the end, however, even with these supplemental, 
interpretive aids, "indeterminacy will be encountered somewhere along the line." P. 250. 
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sponse seems to be that guidance, though important, is not that im-
portant - it is not essential to the concept of law. 
C. Positivism and Metaethics 
Whether readers will agree with Waluchow's claim that moral 
standards can be certain enough to count as law will, of course, de-
pend on one's views about the underlying problem of moral philos-
ophy: What is the status of moral j"qdgments? That question, in 
turn, leads to a more basic puzzle in connection with Waluchow's 
attempt to defend moral standards as legal standards in a positivist 
account: What has happened to the second objection, raised by 
Dworkin, according to which positivism must be seen as committed 
to a theory of law that is independent of the controversial issues of 
moral ontology and metaethics?21 
It now appears that we have three different claims in the litera-
ture about the relation between positivism and metaethics. The 
first is a claim of complete independence of the sort originally made 
by Dworkin and developed by Raz - that positivism must remain 
"independent of any controversial theory either of meta-ethics or of 
moral ontology."28 
The second position appears to be the position Hart endorses: 
· I still think legal theory should avoid commitment to controversial 
philosophical theories of the general status of moral judgments and 
should leave open ... the general question· of whether they have what 
Dworkin calls 'objective standing.' ... Of course, if the question of 
the objective standing of moral judgments is left open by legal theory, 
as I claim it should be, then soft positivism cannot be simply charac-
terized as the theory that moral principles or values may be among 
the criteria of legal validity, since if it is an open question whether 
moral principles and values have objective standing, it must also be an 
open question whether 'soft positivist' provisions purporting to in-
clude conformity with them among the tests for existing law can have 
that effect or instead, can only constitute directions to courts to make 
law in accordance with morality.29 
Hart's position here is somewhat curious: it leaves the question 
of the status of moral principles open, but then it seems to accept as 
a consequence that one must also leave open the question whether 
these principles really are law. Far from being independent of 
metaethical issues, this view seems to lead to a legal theory that is 
27. Although "metaethics" is often used to refer to inquiries into the meaning of moral 
tenns, I shall use it to refer generally to the entire related range of problems in moral theory 
that Dworkin originally suggested a positivist theory must avoid: controversial questions 
about moral ontology (the status of moral judgments) as well as questions about the meaning 
and application of moral tenns. 
28. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHCS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 349. 
29. HART, supra note 1, at 253-54 (citation omitted). 
1750 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1739 
dependent on the resolution of metaethical issues; the theory re-
mains aloof from the question of the status of moral judgments, but 
as a result the legal theory itself will remain incomplete until that 
issue is settled. 
In contrast to both of these positions, Waluchow seems to claim 
that positivism need be neither independent of, nor aloof from, 
questions of metaethics. Instead, as noted, Waluchow simply as-
serts that moral standards are sometimes determinate and capable 
of guiding conduct, thus apparently committing himself to a posi-
tion in favor of the objectivity of moral judgments. 
The problem with Waluchow's position is that it seems to re-
quire arguments that the book really does not contain, arguments 
defending the objective status of moral judgments. Unfortunately, 
the most that we get in the way of argument is the assertion, at 
various points, that "not all moral questions are inherently unset-
tled" (p. 115). As evidence for this assertion, Waluchow cites the 
fact that no one could doubt, for example, that a statute purporting 
to enslave citizens would be held to violate constitutional or Char-
ter provisions that protect equality and similar "moral" rights 
(p. 115). But this evidence does not help Waluchow. When there is 
a clear consensus on a moral issue, the exclusive positivist can also 
accept the Constitution's reference to equality as a legal standard 
because it refers to a social fact, a fact about people's beliefs.JO 
It seems that Waluchow is in something of a quandary. If he 
relies on well-settled moral views to "prove" that moral standards 
can serve as legal standards, he only will aid the exclusive positivist 
by appearing to make social facts the test for law. If, on the other 
hand, he claims that moral standards can count as law even when 
they are not well-settled, he must defend the apparent willingness 
to, claim objectivity for such standards despite their controversial 
nature - a task in metaethics that he does not undertake. 
There is, I think, a possible way out of this dilemma, but it is one 
that requires a return to a position of independence or aloofness 
from metaethical questions. I have been suggesting that Waluchow 
takes a position on the controversial question of the objectivity of 
moral judgments. In fact, however, Waluchow provides a dis-
claimer at the outset that suggests a somewhat different approach 
to the question of the relationship between legal theory and 
metaethics: 
I do not wish to becorne embroiled in any conflicts there might be as 
to the nature and objectivity of moral standards . . . . We will merely 
assume that people do appeal to standards like the principles of 
equality, liberty, fairness, and justice in assessing social institutions 
and their products; that these activities are not totally nonsensical as 
30. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHI'S SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 348. 
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some radical moral nihilists might argue, but are open to at least some 
degree of rational argument and assessment; and that it is these kinds 
of standards that we have in mind when we ask about the possible 
role of political morality in determining the existence and content of 
valid laws. [p. 2 n.3] 
This passage helps clear up the question of Waluchow's position 
on the connection between legal theory and metaethics. Although 
Waluchow is not always consistent,~1 the best interpretation of his 
view is that he himself does not take a stand on the question of the 
status of moral judgments any more than Hart did. Rather, his 
claim about the reality of moral judgments is a claim about how the 
law sees itself, a claim about the view of judges and other officials 
who are engaged in the practice of law. Legal systems that invoke 
moral standards assume what moral philosophers endlessly debate, 
namely, whether moral standards are sufficiently objective and ca-
pable of determinative answers to qualify as legal standards. 
This interpretation - that Waluchow is describing and report-
ing on the implicit assumptions of law rather than defending a 
metaethical claim of his own - is reinforced throughout the book. 
At almost every critical juncture, Waluchow turns to the arguments 
and opinions of judges to demonstrate his claims about how legal 
systems invoke and apply moral standards. This interpretation 
helps make Waluchow's position consistent, but it has implications 
for positivism that he fails to appreciate. I shall return to those im-
plications at the end of this review. First, it is time to look at the 
second issue: How does Waluchow's position differ from 
Dworkin's? · 
III. Is IT STILL Posrriv1sM? 
We have just noted that Waluchow's method of argument relies 
extensively on the evidence of judicial decisions - descriptions of 
how judges invoke and respond to moral standards they are re-
quired to apply. This method bears an obvious resemblance to 
Dworkin's, which also relies on the way that judges write opinions 
as evidence for claims about the connection between moral and 
legal theory. The similarity in method, as well as the similar conclu-
31. Waluchow's position may be that moral standards are (sometimes) "determinate" but 
not necessarily "objective" and that only the former is necessary to qualify as law. In this 
way, he could continue to remain detached from questions about the status of moral judg-
ments. But this position would also require much more in the way of defense and explora-
tion into metaethical questions than Waluchow provides. For example, if moral standards are 
determinate only because of certain facts - facts about human beliefs or social conventions 
- he will not have made a case for going beyond the exclusive positivist's "social fact" 
theory of law. The best interpretation of his position thus seems to be that he believes that 
moral statements are (sometimes) determinate because of moral facts - not social facts -
which seems to be a commitment to some sort of claim about the objective status of such 
judgments. 
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sion that moral standards can be legal standards, leads to the sec-
ond major argument of the book: The incorporation of moral 
standards in law is consistent with positivism and distinguishable 
from Dworkin's version of natural law. 
Two central ideas figure in this part of Waluchow's argument. 
First, Waluchow separates theories of adjudication from theories of 
law (p. 56). Dworkin finds the key to law in the rights litigants have 
before courts - moral rights to particular judicial decisions that are 
the consequence of both political morality and previous legal facts. 
Waluchow, in addition to suggesting technical difficulties with this 
account,32 has a "simpler" suggestion for explaining these rights. 
These rights, he argues, are not the result of a theory of adjudica-
tion that somehow has independent legal or moral status; rather, all 
such rights derive, in the end, from their source in a rule of recogni-
tion or similar "pedigree" of a positivist sort. After all, how judges 
decide cases is itself a matter of the instructions that judges receive, 
and those instructions can be altered by legislators in a manner con-
sistent with positivism. Second, the pedigree that makes the theory 
positivist is a social fact - like Hart's rule of recognition - that 
can, but need not, identify moral standards as standards judges 
should use in deciding cases. We already have seen that this view 
distinguishes Waluchow's theory from that of the exclusive positiv-
ist, who insists that validity is determined by pedigree alone without 
reference to content, as would be required with moral standards. 
The same view of the kind of pedigree that determines legal validity 
distinguishes Waluchow's theory from natural law theories as well. 
The latter theories insist that some reference to content or morality 
is always necessary in determining legal validity; for Waluchow, it 
remains a contingent question which moral standards, if any, a par-
ticular legal system will choose to incorporate by reference in its 
basic pedigree. 
32. Waluchow suggests that Dworkin's theory leads to the odd result that the law will be 
different depending on whether one is in a lower court, which cannot overrule a binding 
precedent, or a higher court, which can. See pp. 46·58. This result, he says, is inconsistent 
with Dworkin's insistence on personifying the legal community in a way that requires it to 
speak "with one consistent voice." See p. 53. 
Waluchow's argument seems to overlook the possibility that the political principles that 
explain why lower and higher courts have different powers will themselves be part of the 
"law" and thus will explain "with one voice" why the results, but not the law, are different in 
different courts. Nothing in Dworkin's theory, in short, prevents his incorporating 
Waluchow's varying "institutional forces of law" as part of what courts must consider in de· 
ciding what legal rights citizens have. 
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IV. Is IT STILL LAw? 
A. The Limits of Pedigree 
With one exception, the above account justifies Waluchow's 
claim that he has defended a theory of law that is at least as consis-
tent and, arguably, as plausible as the main alternatives he consid-
ers - the exclusive positivism of Joseph Raz and the rights theory 
of Ronald Dworkin. But -Waluchow's own argument contains an 
unexplored hint about the limits of even the best form of positivism. 
Waluchow's theory is primatily a pedigree theory of law. The pedi-
gree has been modified to permit incorporation of moral standards, 
but the basic positivist claim - that law is a matter of source, with 
content serving as the test for validity only contingently as source 
permits - is the core of the theory. 
Even if this is still positivism, it may not be all there is to law. 
The real debate, after all, is not over the concept of positivism but 
over the question of which theory of law best reflects our under-
standing of what law is. By Waluchow's own account, as we have 
seen, that question requires paying attention to how officials re-
sponsible for creating and applying legal norms view what they are 
doing. Waluchow finds that the practice of referring to moral stan-
dards reveals an implicit assumption of objective status for morality 
that allows for a contingent connection between law and morality. 
But if this is the test for law, then one must also provide some ac-
count for the other normative claims about the concept of law itself 
that the practice reveals. What are those normative claims, and 
how do they limit the ability of a pedigree theory to account fully 
for law? 
Actually, it was positivism itself that first called attention to this 
normative posture of legal systems, and both of the positivists 
whom Waluchow examines most closely - Hart and Raz - are 
identified closely with this view, in contrast to the more classical 
coercive account of Austin and Bentham. Waluchow, presumably, 
does not advocate returning to a view of law as essentially coercive. 
If, however, law is essentially normative, then it must be true that a 
standard, in order to count as law, must do something besides guide 
conduct. It also must be capable of supporting certain normative 
claims that are made about it. 
Most of Waluchow's consideration of this issue is confined to 
what he calls a "theory of compliance." In the same way that 
Waluchow separates theories of adjudication from theories of law, 
he also suggests that theories of compliance should be separated 
from theories of law. He argues that Dworkin invites confusion by 
trying to account for "wicked law" as law in one sense ("the fact of 
law") (p. 59), but not in another sense (it does not "morally license 
coercive force") (p. 61). This argument seems at odds with 
1754 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1739 
Waluchow's own approach to the issue of metaethics. It may be 
confusing to the legal theorist to try to combine theories of compli-
ance and theories of law, but the question is not whether separating 
these notions makes for a simpler or easier task for the legal philos-
opher. The question is rather whether this "confusing" combina-
tion of "law as fact" and "law as norm" is itself a reflection of how 
insiders, whose concept we are explicating, think of legal systems. 
Just as Waluchow avoids entangling himself in questions of 
metaethics by noting that judges and officials act as if moral stan-
dards are meaningful (however uncomfortable or odd that conclu-
sion may be for the skeptical moral philosopher), so too he should 
consider more carefully what officials say about the normative na-
ture of the concept of law itself: Law guides conduct, not in the way 
that coercive orders do, but rather in the way that normative judg-
ments do, or purport to do. 
B. Including Law's Normative Claims in Legal Theory 
There are two reasons, I think, for Waluchow's failure to see 
that the normative claims made by law place limits on any pedigree-
based account of legal validity. The first reason is his exclusive fo-
cus on morality in the sense of particular legal standards that courts 
contingently are invited to apply. By making this question central 
- what standards can and do courts apply in judicial decisions -
he unduly slights the larger question concerning the moral connec-
tions insiders attach to the concept of law itself. 
Second, when Waluchow does consider the suggestion that law 
may be a concept that refers both to the source of legal standards 
(the pedigree) and also to certain normative claims about those 
standards, he does not distinguish between two different kinds of 
normative claims that one might think are essential to law: claims 
about compliance and claims about the justification of coercion. 
Thus, in discussing Dworkin's mixing of theories of law and theories 
of compliance, Waluchow treats the claim that law justifies coercion 
as apparently the same as the claim that law justifies compliance. 
The difference between these claims, however, is important and 
worth a brief exploration. 
1. Justifying Compliance 
If only standards that actually created moral obligations to com-
ply were to count as law, we would have a connection between legal 
and political theory of the strongest possible type. In fact, however, 
the question whether there is even a prima facie obligation to obey 
law remains controversial, and the suggestion that the obligation to 
obey law is absolute has few or no supporters. These features sug-
gest that considering how insiders view the concept of law lends 
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some support to Waluchow's claim that we should and do separate 
theories of law and theories of compliance.33 
2. Justifying Coercion 
There is, however, a second claim about legal standards that 
cannot be separated from the concept of law so easily. When offi-
cials impose sanctions simply because pedigreed rules have been 
violated, they implicitly claim that the coercion is justified. This ba-
sic claim, which I have described elsewhere as the minimal claim 
that all legal systems make,34 differs from the claim that compliance 
is required in two significant respects. First, there is little disagree-
ment that legal systems are justified in enacting and enforcing 
norms. Tue whole point of the state, after all, is to make decisions 
about what is to be done. Only an anarchist, who denies the state's 
right to exist in the first place, could fail to recognize that the state's 
right to interfere with a citizen's ability to do whatever he would 
otherwise be doing in a state of nature is a fairly easy first step for 
any political theory. It is only the separate and additional claim 
that citizens have duties to obey the state that is controversial. Sec-
ond, this claim about the justification of state coercion attaches to 
law qua law - just because of its pedigree. It is a content-
independent claim about the state's moral justification in acting, in 
good faith, on its own lights in determining how to govern society. 
These two features - the widespread acceptance of the minimal 
normative claim and the fact that the claim is connected to the con-
cept or practice of law itself - make it more difficult to separate 
this moral claim from a theory of law. · 
3. The Essence of Law 
To see why it is so hard to separate this moral claim about law 
from legal theory, let us see what happens if we try. What would be 
the consequence of claiming that we should identify law purely by 
its pedigree without concern for the separate question of whether 
standards so identified can serve as the basis for justified coercion? 
Why is it that this moral question cannot be separated from the fact 
of law in the same way that Waluchow separates theories of compli-
ance from theories of law? To return to Waluchow's consideration 
of this issue in his critique of Dworkin, imagine a case of truly 
"wicked" law in which the conclusion is reached that no moral the-
ory could justify enforcing the law. In other words, standards that 
appear to 11,ave the proper pedigree are nevertheless sufficiently un-
33. For the contrary view, see SOPER, supra note 17, at 101-07. 
34. See Soper, supra note 21; see also Philip Soper, Legal Systems, Normative Systems, 
and the Paradoxes of Positivism, 8 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 363, 375-76 (1995) 
(book review). 
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just that even insiders - officials charged with enforcing the law -
agree that no plausible moral argument can justify coercing those 
who fail to comply. Can one still claim, nevertheless, that such 
standards are law simply because they continue to carry the same 
pedigree as other legal standards that are not so unjust? Because 
law is a practical concept, some practical conclusion, it seems, 
should follow the identification of a standard as "legal." Otherwise, 
as Dworkin notes, "we are suddenly in the peculiar world of legal 
essentialism."35 But the only practical conclusion that is left in the 
case of such wicked standards is the prediction of coercion or force 
- not justified force, but simply power to carry out the sovereign's 
will. Is this still law? 
This ultimate question returns to the problem of the essence of a 
concept that always has haunted this field of jurisprudence. With-
out attempting a resolution of that question, one can note at least 
that the new direction in positivist thinking marked by Hans Kelsen 
and Hart - and carried through by Raz and other "modern" posi-
tivists - has been consistent in rejecting a purely coercive account 
of law as an adequate explication of the concept. Moreover, the 
force of these modern theories of positivism rests largely on the 
same evidence on which Waluchow bases his arguments for viewing 
moral standards as potential legal standards, namely the descriptive 
accounts of the practice of law revealed by the way that insiders use 
and refer to the concept of law. That we would be puzzled about 
what to call standards that have no moral consequence at all is 
some evidence that the moral qualification is not contingent but 
part of the essence of law. The case for natural law, it turns out, 
does not depend on complex theories of adjudication, a la Dworkin, 
nor does it depend on claiming that moral standards must always be 
among the standards courts use, along with tests of pedigree, to de-
termine legal validity. The simplest case for natural law starts 
where Waluchow ends - essentially with a pedigree theory of law. 
It notes only that this pedigree, though it usually will be sufficient 
to determine legal validity, will fail as a test for law in certain ex-
treme cases - extreme cases of the sort that bring to mind the 
Nuremberg principles and the gradual international recognition of 
moral limits on the power of positive law to have any practical ef-
fect other than that of pure coercion. Even if we start with positiv-
ism as the basic model and use pedigrees of either the exclusive or 
the inclusive type to identify law, we still must admit the qualifica-
tion that if the law so identified is too unjust, it is not law and can 
be nothing but pure force. 
35. Ronald Dworkin, A Reply, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRU· 
DENCE 259 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1984). 
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I assume that Waluchow did not mean to return positivism to 
the classical view of Austin, but rather to continue a dialogue within 
the modern version of positivism that Raz and Hart endorse.36 If 
my assumption about Waluchow's intent is correct, his contribution 
serves as a welcome addition to the debate within modem positiv-
ism. But it also serves as a subtle, if unintended, reminder of the 
limits of pedigree theories of law. 
36. Ultimately, the classical view may be the most consistent version of positivism and the 
inevitable position for those who insist on separating law as social fact from even the minimal 
normative claim insiders make about law. 
